University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 1

Number 1

Article 14

January 1976

Treaties: The Interpretation of Due Process in Foriegn Treaties
Richard Rawson
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rawson, Richard (1976) "Treaties: The Interpretation of Due Process in Foriegn Treaties," University of
Dayton Law Review: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 14.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss1/14

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more information, please
contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

TREATIES:
TREATIES.

THE INTERPRETATION OF DUE PROCESS IN FOREIGN

DeTenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975).
I.

THE PRESENT CASE

Maria McGowan was the wife of E.J. McGowan, a United
States national who owned 37 acres of land in Mississippi. McGowan died intestate in Panama on October 31, 1957.
His brother, H.E. McGowan, a Mississippi resident, was notified of the death by a United States consular report which indicated
that Maria was the decedent's widow and listed her address. The
widow was unaware of the land and of her inheritance rights under
a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the
United States and Honduras. As a citizen of Honduras, Maria could
inherit land in the United States under the treaty, provided that she
had the land conveyed to herself within three years of the decedent's
death. The treaty provided that if circumstances so required, the
three-year period could be extended. When Maria died twelve years
after her husband's death, she was still unaware of her right to the
Mississippi acreage.
In 1968, eleven years after his brother's death, H.E. McGowan
brought suit in a Mississippi Chancery Court to quiet title to the
land. Possible claimants in the United States were notified by personal service, and constructive service by publication was provided
by a newspaper circulating in the area where the land was located.
No attempt was made to give notice to or serve process on Maria,
then residing in Honduras. H.E. McGowan was awarded a default
judgment.
When Maria died intestate one year later, her sister, Dorotea
De Tenorio, became her heir. Dorotea learned about the land in
Mississippi and filed a claim to confirm title and interest to the 37
acres in the United States District Court, Southern District of Mississippi.' Also a citizen of Honduras, Dorotea claimed the land as
an heir under the Honduran treaty. Meanwhile, the acreage's attraction had increased with the discovery of oil, and both H.E. and
Dorotea sold drilling rights to the property. The district court held
that Maria's interest in the land could not be divested from her
without due process of law and just compensation. Under the treaty
Dorotea was entitled to the same protection, since she was an heir
of Maria.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held
1. 510 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. July 29,
1975)(No. 74-1586).
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that since the widow failed to sell the property within three years
after her husband's death, as was required by the treaty, she was
deprived of any interest in the property. The court ruled that the
due process guarantees of the treaty applied only to acts of the
signatory countries and were inapplicable to litigation between private parties concerning title to real property.
II.

NOTICE AS A FUNDAMENTAL OF DUE PROCESS

Due process tolerates variances in the type of notice required
when appropriate to the nature of the case.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized certain fundamental requirements for due
process. An elementary requirement of a final proceeding is notice
reasonably calculated under the circumstances to inform interested
parties of the pendancy of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their arguments.' Failure to give such notice is a
violation of due process.' When a benefit is to be administratively
terminated, beneficiaries must be given notice which includes detailed reasons for the proposed termination and affords the parties
an opportunity to prepare for the hearing.
Neither Maria McGowan nor her heir Dorotea were United
States nationals, or aliens within the territorial jurisdictions of the
United States. Therefore, guarantees of due process in the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution-which addresses
itself to citizens and residents-did not apply to them. Hence, any
deficiency in service of process by the Mississippi Chancery Court
to Maria McGowan could not be challenged on the basis of the
fourteenth amendment.
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with
Honduras contains a guarantee of due process for nationals of both
countries and enables them to inherit land in either county. Article
I reads:
The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall enjoy freedom of access to the courts of justice of the other on conforming to
the local laws, as well as for the prosecution as for the defense of their
rights, and in all degrees of jurisdiction established by law.
2. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
3. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
4. Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
at 550 (1960); Nelson v. New York City, 352 U.S. 103 (1956); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112 (1956); New York City v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 344 U.S. 293 (1953);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
5. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
6. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915).
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The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive
within the territories of the other, upon submitting to conditions
imposed upon its nationals, the most constant protection and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that
degree of protection that is required by international law. Their property shall not be taken without due process of law and without payment of just compensation .

. . .

(emphasis added)

The treaty did not define due process; hence the meaning was ambiguous.
When a dispute arises between individuals concerning a treaty
which affects domestic law, the power to interpret treaties rests with
the judicial branch of government.' A fundamental principle of justice inherent in the meaning of due process is notice to parties who
are identifiable and who may have an interest in the dispute. The
Supreme Court has said that notice is a condition almost universally prescribed in legal systems.'
In the instant case, when H.E. McGowan filed a claim to quiet
title to the 37 acres, the Mississippi Chancery Court required only
constructive notice. The court's jurisdiction was in rem because the
subject matter of the dispute was real property located in Mississippi, so that in personam jurisdiction over Maria McGowan was
not necessary. Constructive service in this case was by publication
for three consecutive weeks in the Clarke County Tribune, a newspaper published in the town of Quitman, Clarke County, Mississippi.10 As a nonresident alien residing in Panama and then in Honduras, Maria McGowan had no opportunity to receive actual notice.
Although due process requires, at a minimum, that interested
parties be given notice and opportunity for a hearing," the Supreme
Court has declined to state a comprehensive definition of due process, preferring that its full meaning be gradually ascertained on a
case-by-case basis. 2 Since the Supreme Court has the power to
7. Treaty with Honduras on Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Dec. 7, 1927,
art. I, paras. 3, 4, 45 Stat. 2618, T.S. No. 761 (effective June 7, 1928); [hereinafter cited as
Honduran Treaty].
8. Wilson v. Wall, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 83 (1867); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
(Wheat.) 304 (1803); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 150 (1965).
9. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 110 (1908) [hereinafter cited as Twining];
Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913).
10. The publication was addressed to: "the unknown heirs, devisees and executors, if
any, of E.J. McGowan, deceased, whose whereabouts, places of residence, and post office
addresses are unknown."
11. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), Roller v. Holley, 176 U.S. 398 (1900);
Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
12. Twining at 110. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), rehearingdenied, 368 U.S. 871
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interpret the treaty with Honduras, and since the meaning of due
process has not been given a static, comprehensive definition, the
Court, in this case, could consider the adequacy of the constructive
notice given by publication in the local newspaper. The question
then becomes: Was the constructive service fundamentally fair to
Maria considering her rights under the due process provision of the
treaty?
Before H.E. McGowan filed suit to quiet title to the 37 acres,
he had received notice of his brother's death. Simultaneously, he
had learned Maria's address and the fact that she was E.J.'s
widow. 3 With such information in H.E.'s possession, constructive
notice by publication in the local newspaper was an unreasonable
procedure. It could be argued that under the circumstances a requirement of actual notice to Maria existed, based on the due process provision of the treaty.
If the Supreme Court decides to grant certiorari in the De
Tenorio case, a holding grounded in treaty interpretation is one
possibility. That is, the Supreme Court, in this situation, might
consider equating the notice requirements of due process extrapolated from suits interpretating the fourteenth amendment with the
due process provision of the treaty. The Court has the power to
interpret the meaning 4of due process since it was left undefined in
the Honduran treaty.'
Case law has established various notice requirements for actions based on in rem jurisdiction. Courts require that in each case
a method for service of process be used that is most reasonably
calculated to give the party notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. This notice must reasonably convey the required
information about a pending action, and must afford a reasonable
time for answer, given the circumstances of the case. 5 The Supreme
Court has traditionally insisted that whatever its form, opportunity
for a hearing must be provided before the deprivation of property
at issue takes effect. That a hearing is subject to waiver, or is not
fixed in form does not affect this basic requirement except in extraordinary circumstances.' 6
If a party's whereabouts are unknown, constructive service by
(1961); Local 473, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Territory v. Craig
Enterprises, Inc., 355 P.2d 397 (Alas. 1960).
13. The report named Obdulia McGowan (Maria) as the widow of E.J. McGowan and
his heir. It gave her address-Calle 5, Casa 6226, Juan Diaz, Panama.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
15. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
16. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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publication can be sufficient since under the circumstances it is the
method most reasonably calculated to give notice. If a person's address is known, even though he is a nonresident living outside the
state where the property is located, due process requires more than
constructive service by publication. In these situations, substitute
service by mail is the method "most reasonably calculated" to give
actual notice.' 7 If H.E. McGowan had not known Maria, due process
presumably would have been satisfied by personal service upon all
known claimants and constructive notice in the local newspaper.,'
However, H.E. McGowan knew of the widow and her location, notice to her was necessary before he sought to quiet title to the 37
acres. If Maria had been a resident alien, i.e., within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, it is clear that the requirements
of notice from the rule of Mullane would not have been met, since
substitute service by mail was possible. However, the requirements
that procedural due process conform to "traditional standards of
fair play and substantial justice" do not apply absent the protection
of the fourteenth amendment. 9 And, as previously stated, the nonresident alien status of both Maria and Dorotea excluded them from
fourteenth amendment coverage.
Since the Court has the power to interpret the meaning of due
process in the treaty, what criteria should it use? Despite the inapplicability of fourteenth amendment criteria, the Supreme Court's
equating of those criteria with the due process provision of the treaty
is not totally foreclosed. When interpreting a treaty, the rules of
construction of treaties require that provisions be construed liberally and given full force and effect, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'"(Emphasis
added.) When two constructions are possible, one restrictive of
rights and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred. 2
If these notice requirements are established for the treaty, then the
chancery court's notice procedure would not have conformed to due
process. Nonresident aliens are able to inherit real property in the
United States, as long as a treaty exists between the country of their
citizenship and the United States, and the treaty provides inheri17. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
18. Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 275 (1896).
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 452 (1930);
Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928).
21. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1880) [hereinafter cited as Hausenstein].
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tance rights. 2 The Honduran treaty at issue provides inheritance
rights. Article IV reads:
Where, on the death of any person holding real . . .property or
interests therein within the territories of one [signatory country],
such property or interests therein would, by the laws of the country
.. . descend . . . to a national of the other [signatory country],
whether resident or nonresident, were he not disqualified by the laws
of the country where such property . . . therein is . . .situated, such
national shall be allowed a term of 3 years in which to sell the same,
this term to be reasonably prolonged if circumstances render it necessary . . . without restraint or interference, and exempt from any
succession probate, or administrative duties or charges other than
those which may be imposed in like cases upon the nationals of the
country ....

23

Thus Maria had inheritance rights under the treaty as the
widow of E.J. McGowan; and Dorotea, the heir of Maria. According
to the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution, a treaty which
guarantees inheritance rights and attaches due process obligations
to those rights supersedes conflicting state procedural law governing
the giving of notice in an in rem proceeding if the effect of the state's
notice procedure violates the guaranty of the treaty. A liberal reading of the treaty's due process provision, coupled with the effect of
the supremacy clause, would thus result in effective, albeit not technical, incorporation of the fourteenth amendment procedural due
process guarantees into the De Tenorio situation.
III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW WHEN FEDERAL POLITICAL BRANCHES HAVE NOT
ACTED TO SETTLE A NONRESIDENT ALIEN'S CLAIM

Political departments of the federal government did not exercise their powers to settle Dorotea's claim to the property as Maria's
heir. A similar situation existed in Zschernig v. Miller.5 Pursuant
to a state statute, Oregon courts denied an inheritance to a nonresident alien who was a resident of East Germany because he could not
convince the court that his country would reciprocate by allowing
U.S. nationals to inherit estates in that country. In an amicus curiae
brief before the Supreme Court, the United States Department of
Justice argued that the Oregon escheat statute did not unduly interfere with the conduct of United States foreign relations and, there22.

Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928);

Hauenstein at 487 (1880).
23.

Honduran Treaty, art IV., para. 1.

24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (supremacy clause).
25. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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fore, did not intrude upon the preemptive power of the federal government. The Supreme Court reversed the state court, finding that
Oregon had intruded into the field of foreign affairs; an area which
the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress. Reversal was ordered in Zschernig even though in that case neither the
legislative nor executive branches had exercised powers, and the
justice department had actually argued against its use. In the instant case, there is similar governmental inaction on the federal
level. Based on Zschernig, the Supreme Court retains the power to
strike down the chancery court's decision finding title in H.E.
McGowan, even though other federal branches have not acted. The
act was by an instrumentality of the state of Mississippi, and therefore, it could be viewed as an intrusion by a state into the field of
foreign affairs. According to Zschernig, the Court's power to overturn the state court's decision would rest on the federal function of
judicial review of state actions which overstep a constitutional
power inherent in the federal government. The power is to conduct
United States foreign relations. The Supreme Court has considered
it to be an inherent power in the Constitution, and not an explicit
one.26
IV.

EFFECT OF MISSISSIPPI'S SPECIAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN RESTRICTING
ALIENS FROM EXPLOITING OIL LOCATED IN THE STATE

Mississippi law holds that nonresident aliens are barred from
owning real property within its jurisdiction. The statute provides:
Resident aliens may acquire and hold land, and may dispose of it and
transmit it by descent, as citizens of the state may; but nonresident
ailens shall not hereafter acquire or hold land . . . .
Clearly the statute discriminates against a class of aliensthose who are nonresidents. Based on the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, state statutes which discriminate
against a class of aliens admitted into the United States have been
held inherently suspect.28 However, there are earlier decisions
which have upheld state laws that bar aliens from exploiting natural
resources of a state on the reasoning that the state has a special
public interest in favoring its own citizens over aliens in the distri26. This doctrine is relatively new and is not clearly accepted by the Court; perhaps
the Court will expand on it if De Tenorio is reviewed. An analysis of the doctrine is given in
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 238-41 (1975).
27. Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972).
28. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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bution of its limited resources. 9 Since oil was found beneath the
McGowan land, it could be argued that because of the current oil
shortage, Mississippi has a special public interest in excluding aliens from exploiting oil resources located within its borders. However, in light of recent decisions, it is unlikely that this argument
would be successful against Dorotea's claim.
In Heim v. McCall, 0 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
state statutes which limited the right of noncitizens to exploit the
state's natural resources or restricted the devolution of real property
to aliens under the special public interest doctrine. However, Heim
is easily distinguishable because of the absence of an overriding
treaty in that case. In Graham v. Richardson,"'the Court was doubtful that a special public interest would justify prohibiting aliens
from fishing in certain waters, while allowing others to do so. After
discussing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,32 the Court said:
Whatever may be the contemporary vitality of the special public
interest doctrine in other contexts after Takahashi, we conclude that
a state's desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens
is inadequate to justify Pennsylvania's making noncitizens ineligible
for public assistance, and Arizona's restricting benefits to citizens
and longtime resident aliens. First the special public interest doctrine
was heavily grounded on the notion that [w]hatever is a privilege
rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship.
[Citation omitted.] But this Court now has rejected the concept that
constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is
characterized as a right or as a privilege.3
Therefore, in De Tenorio the argument that Mississippi has a
special public interest in prohibiting aliens from exploiting oil
within its jurisdiction seems contrary both to the Court's ruling in
Graham and to the current trend which has given decreasing weight
to the public interest doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

If the Court equates the notice requirements of due process,
under the fourteenth amendment, with the Treaty's due process
provision, the question arises as to the limits of equating further
constitutional guarantees with guarantees in United States treaties.
29.
(1914).

30.
31.
32.
33.

Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138

239
403
334
403

U.S. 175 (1915).
U.S. 365 (1971).
U.S. 410 (1948).
U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
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The Court need go no further than establish the due process requirement for this treaty in order to settle the present dispute. But the
embodiment of other constitutional requirements to aid in foreign
treaty interpretations, in line with the Court's treatment of "due
process," will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Richard Rawson
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